Referee's Eye: When VAR Becomes the 23rd Witness on the Pitch

Hook: 68.4% and 91.2% – Two Numbers That Do Not Sit Side by Side by Chance

In the 78th minute of the 2026 World Cup opening match between Russia and Saudi Arabia, head referee Néstor Pitana stopped the game inside the penalty area. His hand touched his earpiece. The Luzhniki stands fell silent for seven seconds – seven seconds I counted on my personal notepad, seven seconds longer than any penalty I had witnessed in any competition. When Pitana pointed to the penalty spot, the pitch clock had passed from the 78th to the 79th minute. That was the first VAR intervention in a World Cup opening match – and the start of 335 other interventions across all 64 matches of the tournament.

I watched all 64 of those matches. Not as a fan, not as an emotional commentator, but as a whistle-holder observing whistles – recording every decision, every frame, every second the game stopped. My notebook has 335 lines. Each line corresponds to a moment when the law was called out on the pitch, each line corresponds to a single question: was this decision correct according to the written law, or only correct according to the immediate feeling of the human eye?

Context: When the Law Was Never Written to Please the Stands

Before we get to the numbers, context must be set. VAR did not fall from the sky. It is the direct consequence of a decade of debate about consistency in law application. In 2026, in South Africa, Frank Lampard shot the ball off the crossbar, the ball crossed the goal line clearly – the referee did not award the goal. In 2026, in Brazil, more than a dozen controversial group-stage decisions were questioned by the refereeing community itself. By 2026, FIFA approved large-scale VAR trials, and by the 2026 World Cup in Russia, the system ran full-time across all 64 matches.

IFAB – the body that governs the world's football laws – laid out three categories of situations in which VAR is permitted to intervene: goals, penalty kicks, direct red cards, and mistaken identity in the above situations. Nothing more, nothing less. This is not a suggestion. This is the law. And like every other law, it exists to limit the power of the person applying it.

But here is what very few people notice: IFAB did not only limit the situations, it also limited the threshold of intervention. "Clear and obvious error" is the only standard by which VAR is permitted to overturn a decision on the pitch. Those four words, in English, carry more weight than every compliment or criticism from the stands. It means: 51% wrong, no intervention. 70% wrong, no intervention. Only when the error reaches the point where it can no longer be argued does VAR speak up.

The problem is: in the group stage, that standard was applied differently. And that is why my data table has two numbers that do not sit side by side by chance.

Core: 335 Interventions, 20 Overturned Decisions, 10 VAR Penalties

I built the table match by match. Each line specified: the moment, the type of situation (goal/penalty/red card/mistaken identity), the head referee, the time the game stopped (seconds), the intervention result (correct/incorrect according to footage), and the round classification. By the end of the France – Croatia final on July 15, 2026, I had 335 interventions, averaging 5.23 per match – a figure roughly 40% higher than I had predicted before the tournament.

Of those 335 interventions, only 20 decisions were overturned on the pitch, and 10 penalty kicks were established from VAR. The overturn rate relative to total interventions is 5.97% – meaning more than 94% of interventions led to the conclusion: the on-pitch decision was correct. This number matters. It says VAR is not a tool for "correcting errors," but a tool for "confirming correctness."

But if you want to understand what VAR is really doing, look at its accuracy by round.

Table 1: VAR's Correction Accuracy by Round

| Round | Matches | Interventions | Overturned | Accuracy Rate | |-------|---------|---------------|------------|---------------| | Group stage | 48 | 201 | 14 | 68.4% | | Round of 16 | 8 | 42 | 3 | 88.1% | | Quarter-finals | 4 | 34 | 1 | 91.2% | | Semi-finals | 2 | 28 | 1 | 89.3% | | Final | 1 | 30 | 1 | 93.3% | | Total | 64 | 335 | 20 | — |

The gap between 68.4% in the group stage and 91.2% in the quarter-finals is not random. It has three measurable causes.

First, lower intervention density in the knockout rounds. The group-stage average was 4.19 interventions per match; the knockout average was 6.7 – but intervention quality was far higher. In the group stage, VAR was frequently dragged into edge situations – a player falling in the box during a 50-50 challenge, the ball striking a hand at a distance under 1 metre, an offside call off by a few centimetres. In the knockout rounds, score pressure made fouls clearer – and more importantly, head referees tended to call VAR only when they themselves were unsure.

Second, referee experience accumulates across rounds. In the group stage, some referees were working with VAR for the first time at World Cup scale. In the knockout rounds, the organisers appointed only the most experienced referees. I cross-checked: 14 of the 20 overturned group-stage decisions occurred under referees working with VAR for the first time in a senior international match.

Third, and this is the least-discussed point: the "clear and obvious" threshold was applied differently depending on match context. In the group stage, referees were often instructed to accept a lower intervention threshold in order to "set the norm" for the whole tournament. In the knockout rounds, the threshold was higher – because a wrong decision in the knockout rounds could end an entire team's tournament.

Table 2: Classification of the 335 Interventions by Situation

| Situation Type | Interventions | Share | Overturned | |----------------|---------------|-------|------------| | Goals (offside, prior foul) | 112 | 33.4% | 8 | | Penalty kicks | 98 | 29.3% | 10 | | Direct red cards | 47 | 14.0% | 2 | | Mistaken identity | 28 | 8.4% | 0 | | Boundary checks (handball, challenges) | 50 | 14.9% | 0 | | Total | 335 | 100% | 20 |

Looking at this table, two things stand out. First, the "boundary check" group accounts for nearly 15% of all interventions but led to no overturned decision. This is the group of situations in which VAR was used as a confirming tool, not a correcting tool. Second, the "mistaken identity" group – situations where the referee red-carded the wrong player – had 28 interventions but no overturns. This means: in all mistaken-identity situations, the head referee identified the correct player as soon as VAR alerted him.

Table 3: Comparing VAR Interventions at World Cup 2026 with Other Competitions

| Competition | Matches | Interventions/match | Overturns/match | |-------------|---------|---------------------|-----------------| | World Cup 2026 | 64 | 5.23 | 0.31 | | Bundesliga 2026-18 | 306 | 2.87 | 0.19 | | Serie A 2026-18 | 380 | 3.12 | 0.22 | | Premier League 2026-19 | 380 | 3.44 | 0.24 | | Chinese Super League 2026 | 240 | 4.18 | 0.28 |

World Cup 2026 had a higher intervention density than any top-flight league of the same period. This is not because World Cup referees are worse – it is because political and media pressure in a World Cup match is higher than in any league match. No club-level round has 1.2 billion viewers.

Core (continued): Four Decisions That Shaped an Entire Tournament

If I had to choose four VAR moments for the deepest analysis, I would choose the four with the greatest impact on the tournament's outcome – and the highest controversy under the standards of the law.

Decision 1: Penalty for France in the Final, 38th Minute

The situation: Antoine Griezmann took a free kick, the ball struck Ivan Perišić's hand inside the box. Head referee Néstor Pitana pointed to the penalty spot after consulting VAR. Under Article 12 of the Laws of the Game, handball is defined as the act of "deliberately touching the ball with the hand or arm." The issue is: Perišić did not actively move his hand toward the ball – the ball arrived at his hand from under 0.8 metres after hitting his head.

Why did VAR still intervene? Because at that moment – July 2026 – IFAB was still applying a broad interpretation: "hand in an unnatural position" was a sign of deliberateness, regardless of distance. Only after World Cup 2026 did IFAB tighten this definition at its March 2026 meeting, adding a 0.9-metre distance criterion and excluding hands positioned directly inside the body.

In other words: that decision was correct under the law at the time, but it became one of the precedents that forced IFAB to rewrite the law. This is the nature of law application: the law is not static, it evolves with reality.

Decision 2: The Disallowed Goal of Paulo Dybala, Round of 16

No, not Dybala. I misspoke. The more significant incident was in the France – Argentina round-of-16 match: Benjamin Pavard's 57th-minute goal was awarded after VAR checked for offside, but Jesús Gallardo's goal for Mexico against Sweden was disallowed because a teammate was offside in the build-up in the 62nd minute.

In the Mexico – Sweden situation: the player deemed offside was 14 centimetres ahead of the last defender according to footage. What stands out is: those 14 centimetres did not affect the attack at all – that player did not receive the ball, did not obstruct, did not create an advantage. But under Article 11 of the Laws of the Game, offside is defined as any part of a player's body "ahead of the last defender" that could affect play. A player in an offside position may be penalised if the referee judges him to have "participated in active play" – and under IFAB's 2026 guidance, any player in an offside position during a teammate's attack was deemed to have participated.

This is the false binary I see many referees fall into during their first year with VAR: interpreting the law literally while ignoring the purpose of the law. The offside law exists to prevent players from "standing around" waiting for the ball. If an offside player 14 centimetres ahead does not receive the ball, does not block a defender, does not affect play, then disallowing the goal is a literal application – technically correct, but worth discussing in spirit.

Decision 3: Red Card for Ricardo Quaresma, Portugal – Iran

In the 89th minute of Portugal – Iran, Quaresma saw the ball strike his hand inside the box. Head referee Enrique Cáceres did not call a foul. VAR intervened, Cáceres stopped the game and consulted the monitor – and declined. This was one of the only VAR interventions at World Cup 2026 in which VAR requested a review but the head referee kept his original decision.

This incident raised a question to which I still lack a satisfactory answer: If VAR is the "23rd witness" on the pitch, why can that witness be ignored by the very referee who summoned it?

Under IFAB's VAR protocol: the head referee has the final say. VAR only proposes, it does not impose. This is designed to preserve "pitch authority" – but it also creates a loophole: a head referee can commit a double error – the initial error, and the error of ignoring evidence.

Contrarian: Stadium Emotion Is Noise – But Sometimes the Noise Is Right

Here I must say something my colleagues may not like. I am a defender of consistency in the law. I believe stadium emotion is noise to be shut out when making decisions. But after 335 VAR interventions that I recorded, I must admit: there are situations where the stadium noise is more right than the footage.

Take the Quaresma incident. On footage, the ball struck Quaresma's hand at 1.2 metres, his hand in a natural position. Applying the law strictly: not a foul. But if you stand in the stands 40 metres from that play, you see a player extending his hand, the ball changing direction, and a goalscoring opportunity destroyed. In football, an opportunity destroyed by a part of the body not permitted to play the ball – even unintentionally – is still an opportunity destroyed.

This is the false binary both sides fall into. The emotional side says: "Must penalise, the ball hit the hand." The legal side says: "No penalty, hand in a natural position." Both are right within their own scope, and both are wrong when applied outside that scope.

What I learned from 335 VAR interventions: the law is not a set of rigid rules to be applied mechanically. The law is a framework of communication through which two sides – players and supervisors – agree on what is permitted and what is not. When the two sides disagree on the spirit of the law, then no matter how technically correct the decision, it still generates controversy.

One interesting thing: after World Cup 2026, IFAB met three times within 18 months to adjust the handball law. First in March 2026 – adding the distance criterion. Second in June 2026 – adding the "hand above the shoulder" criterion. Third in March 2026 – tightening the definition of "hand in a natural position" for specific plays. Three amendments in 18 months – that is evidence that the law is chasing reality, not reality chasing the law.

Core (continued): VAR and the Consistency Problem Across Competitions

There is one question I received most from readers throughout World Cup 2026: "Why is the same situation a penalty in one match and not in another?"

This is the right question. And the answer lies in a concept rarely mentioned by football commentators: consistency by referee group.

Across the 64 matches of World Cup 2026, FIFA used 36 head referees from 30 countries. Each referee came from a league system with a different tradition of applying the law. English referees tended to allow stronger contact in the Premier League; Spanish referees tended to penalise handball more strictly in La Liga; German referees tended to call offside at the centimetre threshold in the Bundesliga. When these 36 referees meet at one tournament, a clash of norms is unavoidable.

Table 4: VAR Intervention Rate by Referee Group (Group Stage)

| Referee Group | Matches Officiated | Interventions/match | Overturned | |---------------|--------------------|---------------------|------------| | UEFA (Europe) | 22 | 4.02 | 5 | | CONMEBOL (South America) | 14 | 4.57 | 5 | | AFC (Asia) | 8 | 4.88 | 3 | | CAF (Africa) | 4 | 5.25 | 1 | | Total | 48 | 4.19 | 14 |

The difference between UEFA's 4.02 interventions/match and CAF's 5.25 interventions/match is 1.23 interventions/match – roughly a 30% gap. This is not a difference in competence, but a difference in the norm of law application.

I cross-checked this data against Bundesliga 2026-18. German referees working in the Bundesliga had a VAR intervention rate of 2.87 interventions/match. At World Cup 2026, the same German referee group (including Felix Brych and Felix Zwayer) had an intervention rate of 3.96 interventions/match – 38% higher. This means: just by changing match context, the same referee applies VAR differently.

This is one of the most important findings from my data: VAR does not eliminate the referee's subjectivity – it merely shifts that subjectivity from the on-pitch decision to the decision about the intervention threshold. The referee is still the one deciding when to call VAR, when not to; when to review, when not to; when to overturn, when not to. VAR is not an automatic judge – it is a tool operated by humans.

Contrarian: A Counter-Intuitive View of VAR

When I talk with colleagues in China and Vietnam, there is a common assumption I always have to face: that VAR is a tool to make football fairer, and if it has not yet achieved that, the problem lies in the technology. I disagree with both parts of that assumption.

VAR is not a tool to make football fairer. VAR is a tool to make refereeing decisions verifiable. These are two different objectives, and they often conflict.

If the objective were fairness, you would want VAR to intervene in every unfair situation – including those the referee could not see. If the objective is verifiability, you want VAR to intervene only in situations where footage can provide clear evidence. FIFA chose the second objective – and that means VAR will always leave a gap of justice.

Take the incident in the Sweden – South Korea group match. In the 65th minute, a South Korean player was brought down inside the box. Footage from the main angle did not clearly show contact; footage from the reverse angle showed light contact. VAR did not intervene because there was no "clear and obvious error." In reality, there may have been a foul – but because footage could not confirm it, VAR could not intervene. Justice on a technical level was left empty, but verifiability was preserved.

This is the second false binary I see many people fall into: treating "fairness" and "verifiability" as compatible objectives. They are not compatible in every case. And when forced to choose, FIFA chooses verifiability – because that is the foundation of every legal system.

This leads to a consequence I rarely see discussed adequately: VAR creates a new kind of injustice – not the injustice of a wrong decision, but the injustice of a decision that cannot be confirmed as right. Before VAR, a team could complain that the referee missed a foul. After VAR, a team can complain that the referee missed a foul, and VAR confirmed there was not enough evidence to intervene. The feeling of injustice after VAR can be stronger than before VAR – because now it appears more "official."

Core (continued): VAR in the Knockout Rounds – When Error Becomes Destiny

In the knockout rounds, pressure shifts from "accuracy" to "must not err." Because a mistake in the knockout rounds can end a team's tournament, referees tend to apply a higher intervention threshold – meaning they call VAR less, but when they do, they review more carefully.

Table 5: Comparing VAR Processing Time by Round

| Round | Average time/intervention (seconds) | Longest (seconds) | |-------|-------------------------------------|-------------------| | Group stage | 42 | 128 | | Round of 16 | 56 | 147 | | Quarter-finals | 68 | 189 | | Semi-finals | 74 | 203 | | Final | 82 | 215 |

In the France – Croatia final, one VAR intervention lasted 215 seconds – more than three and a half minutes. That was the longest intervention of the whole tournament, and it occurred on the penalty for France in the 38th minute. During those three and a half minutes, referee Pitana reviewed at least four different angles.

The striking detail: the average VAR processing time in the group stage was 42 seconds, while in the final it was 82 seconds – nearly double. Knockout-round referees spent more time reviewing, not because the situations were more complex, but because they knew a mistake at this stage was beyond repair.

In total, VAR interventions at World Cup 2026 consumed 14,070 seconds – equivalent to 234 minutes, or nearly four hours of football stopped. Spread across 64 matches, that is about 3.7 minutes stopped per match for VAR. That is a considerable price for verifiability.

But the question is: was that price worth it? I had the chance to discuss this with a FIFA official in Moscow in July 2026. He told me something I have remembered since: "We are not trying to make football perfect. We are trying to make football believable."

That statement has shaped how I have viewed VAR ever since. VAR is not aimed at making referees never wrong. VAR is aimed at making fans believe that important decisions have been seriously reviewed. That is a more modest goal – but also a more realistic one.

Core (continued): Four Edge Situations and How the Law Is Called

I want to go into four specific edge situations to show how the law is called in practice.

Edge situation 1: "Toenail offside" – France – Australia, group stage

In the 81st minute, Antoine Griezmann scored after a long attacking move. VAR intervened and found a French player offside on the left – by a part of the right toenail roughly 2 centimetres ahead of Australia's last defender. The goal was disallowed.

This is the situation VAR technology was designed to handle most precisely – the offside line. But it is also the situation where technology generates the most controversy. Because under the law, offside is offside, whether 2 centimetres or 20 centimetres. But in the footballing sense, 2 centimetres is negligible.

The main complaint from Australia after the match was: if the technology has a margin of error, why not apply a tolerance threshold? I checked the issue: the VAR system at World Cup 2026 used 33 cameras, with a measurement error of ±1.5 centimetres. This means that technically, a 2-centimetre offside could in reality be 0.5 centimetres or 3.5 centimetres. Both are offside under the law, but the margin of error raises a question about the intervention threshold.

IFAB subsequently did not apply a tolerance threshold for offside. The reason: any tolerance threshold would create a new boundary for controversy. If the threshold were 2 centimetres, there would be questions about a 2.1-centimetre offside. If the threshold were 3 centimetres, there would be questions about 3.1 centimetres. IFAB's solution was to keep the definition of "any part of the body" and accept that there would be controversy at the boundary.

Edge situation 2: Handball at close range – Portugal – Iran, group stage

I mentioned the Quaresma incident above. I want to go deeper into this situation once more to analyse the structure of the law.

Under Article 12 of the Laws of the Game (2026-19 edition), handball is defined as the act of "deliberately touching the ball with the hand or arm." The criteria for determining "deliberateness" include:

• Movement of the hand toward the ball
• Distance between the ball and the hand
• Position of the hand relative to the body
• Whether the player could have avoided contact

In the Quaresma situation: his hand was in a natural position beside his body, he did not actively move his hand toward the ball, and the distance from where the ball hit his head to his hand was 1.2 metres – beyond the 0.9-metre threshold IFAB would later set. Under current criteria (2026), this is not a foul. Under the criteria at the time (2026), this was an edge situation – and referee Cáceres decided not to penalise.

Interestingly: after the match, Cáceres himself said in an interview that he was "unhappy with how IFAB interpreted the handball law" and that "the law needs to be rewritten more clearly." Three years later, IFAB did rewrite the handball law – and the new definition was close to how Cáceres had interpreted it in that match.

Edge situation 3: Direct red cards and the "clear" standard

In the 44th minute of Germany – Sweden, group stage, centre-back Jérôme Boateng received a second yellow card and was sent off. Earlier, in the 25th minute, Boateng had made a challenge that could have been deemed a direct red but only received a yellow. VAR did not intervene.

Question: Why did VAR not intervene on the 25th-minute situation? Answer: under IFAB's VAR protocol, a direct red card can only be reviewed if it is "clear and obvious." Boateng's 25th-minute situation was a challenge at a level that could be a yellow, could be a red – and when there is no clarity, VAR does not intervene.

This is the false binary many fans fall into: believing VAR should intervene in every situation that could be a red card. In reality, VAR only intervenes in situations where the wrong decision is "clear and obvious." If the referee decides yellow for a challenge, and that situation could be interpreted as yellow or red, then VAR does not intervene – because there is no clear error.

Edge situation 4: Mistaken identity – Argentina – Nigeria, group stage

In the 78th minute of Argentina – Nigeria, the head referee showed a yellow card to an Argentine player for a challenge. VAR intervened and found that the penalised player was not the one who made the challenge – the actual offender was a different player standing 4 metres away.

Under Article 12, the referee has the power to card any player involved in the foul situation. But IFAB has specific guidance: if the referee identifies the wrong player, VAR must intervene to correct. In this situation, VAR intervened correctly. The yellow card was transferred from player A to player B.

Notably: of the 28 VAR interventions for mistaken identity at World Cup 2026, none led to the card being fully rescinded – only transferred from one player to another. This means: in most mistaken-identity situations, an actual foul had occurred, only the wrong person was penalised. IFAB resolves this by transferring the card, not by rescinding it.

Core (continued): Lessons from 38 Contract Disputes of the COVID Season

Here I want to shift slightly to apply the data approach to a different field: contract disputes during the COVID season.

In March 2026, global football was suspended for 97 days. During that period, I built the "COVID-19 Force Majeure Tracker," surveying 386 player contracts across 5 major leagues and the Chinese Super League. When 38 contract termination cases were filed with FIFA's Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC), I firmly predicted only 4 would win – the actual outcome was 5.

What I learned from those 38 cases relates directly to how I analyse VAR: in any legal system, the outcome depends not only on the written law, but on how the law is interpreted – and interpretation depends on context, precedent, and the person applying it.

In the 5 successful player cases at the FIFA DRC, there was a common feature: in all 5, the contract lacked a specific force majeure clause, and all 5 players had gone at least 3 consecutive months without wages. In the 33 failed cases, most contracts had a force majeure clause or a clause allowing the club to reduce wages in an emergency.

Applying this to VAR: when the law is clear (contract with a specific clause), the likelihood of controversy is low. When the law is vague (contract without a specific clause), the likelihood of controversy is high – and the outcome depends heavily on the decision-maker. This is exactly VAR's problem: when the law is clear (offside is offside), VAR works well; when the law is vague ("deliberate" handball), VAR generates controversy.

Core (continued): The Difference Between the World Cup and Domestic Leagues

There is one question I am always asked when discussing VAR: why does VAR work differently at the World Cup versus domestic leagues?

Table 6: Comparing VAR Application Contexts

| Factor | World Cup | Domestic League | |--------|-----------|-----------------| | Matches | 64 (max 7 per team) | 380 (38 per team) | | Media pressure | Global level | National level | | Referees | 36 referees, 30 countries | 20-25 referees, 1 country | | Applied norms | Diverse | Uniform | | VAR cameras | 33 cameras | 12-20 cameras | | Measurement error | ±1.5 centimetres | ±3-5 centimetres |

The biggest difference between the World Cup and domestic leagues is the applied norm. In a domestic league, the same referee group works together for 38 rounds, developing a shared norm. At the World Cup, 36 referees from 30 countries meet within 4 weeks and must agree on a norm in a very short time. This is the main reason for the difference in intervention rates.

Table 7: Number of VAR Cameras and Influence on Decisions

| Competition | Cameras | Error | Overturn rate | |-------------|---------|-------|---------------| | World Cup 2026 | 33 | ±1.5 cm | 5.97% | | Premier League 2026-19 | 16 | ±3 cm | 6.98% | | Bundesliga 2026-18 | 20 | ±2.5 cm | 6.62% | | Serie A 2026-18 | 14 | ±4 cm | 7.05% |

Looking at this table, one thing stands out: the overturn rate at the World Cup (5.97%) is lower than in domestic leagues (6.62% – 7.05%). This means: with more cameras and a smaller error margin, World Cup referees tended to make more accurate decisions from the start. Technology does not only help correct errors – it helps prevent them.

Contrarian: Three False Beliefs About VAR

After analysing data from 335 VAR interventions, I want to confront three false beliefs I see prevalent in football communities.

False belief 1: "VAR makes football fairer"

As I analysed above, VAR does not make football fairer – it makes football more verifiable. These are two different objectives. VAR can correct some wrong decisions, but it also creates a new kind of injustice: the injustice of a decision that cannot be confirmed. Across 335 interventions, only 20 decisions were overturned. This means that in the remaining 315 cases, VAR confirmed the original decision. If an original decision was wrong but not "clear" enough for VAR to intervene, that error persists – and now appears more "official."

False belief 2: "VAR removes subjectivity from referees"

This is the most dangerous false belief, because it leads to false expectations. VAR does not remove subjectivity – it shifts subjectivity from the on-pitch decision to the decision about the intervention threshold. The referee still has to decide when to call VAR, when not to. The referee still has to decide when an error is "clear and obvious." These decisions are no less subjective than on-pitch decisions.

According to my data, different referees have intervention rates ranging from 3.12 to 5.25 per match – a gap of 68%. This is evidence that subjectivity persists at the level of the intervention-threshold decision.

False belief 3: "Technology will solve every problem"

From World Cup 2026 to now, FIFA has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in VAR technology, including high-speed cameras, ball sensors, and AI support systems. But according to my data, the rate of controversy over refereeing decisions has not declined significantly. If World Cup 2026 had about 335 controversial VAR interventions, then World Cup 2026 had about 380 – an increase rather than a decrease, despite better technology.

This means: technology does not solve the problem of norms. Only clearer law-writing and more consistent referee training can. Technology is a tool – but not a solution.

Core (continued): Codifying the Match – Four Specific Situations

I want to close the data analysis by codifying four specific situations – turning them from "plays" into "legal propositions" the reader can consult.

Legal proposition 1: When is a foul inside the box?

Under Article 12, a foul inside the box is a penalty kick if three conditions are met: 1. There is physical contact between the attacking player and the defending player 2. The contact occurs inside the box (including the goal line) 3. The contact is "careless, reckless, or using excessive force"

In Griezmann's situation in the 2026 final: the contact with Perišić was not physical contact – the ball struck a hand. This means the situation must be handled under Article 12 on handball, not under Article 12 on fouls.

Legal proposition 2: When is it handball?

Under Article 12 (2026 edition), handball is penalised if one of three conditions is met: 1. The player actively moves the hand toward the ball 2. The hand is in an "unnatural" position that makes the body bigger 3. The ball strikes the hand after leaving the body or another part of the player, and the player scores or creates a goalscoring opportunity

Condition 3 is the most important in modern football – it is called the "golden goal clause." If the ball strikes a player's hand and that player scores – even from an unintentional handball – the goal is disallowed.

Legal proposition 3: When is it offside?

Under Article 11, a player is offside if three conditions are met: 1. The player is ahead of the opponent's last defender 2. The player is ahead of the ball 3. The player is somewhere in the opponent's half

But offside is only penalised if that player "participates in active play" – which includes: - Receiving the ball - Obstructing an opponent - Gaining an advantage from the offside position

Edge situation: an offside player who does not participate in active play – for example, a player standing in an offside position while another teammate in an onside position scores. Under IFAB guidance, that player may still be penalised if the referee judges he affects the opposing defender.

Legal proposition 4: When is a direct red card?

Under Article 12, a direct red card applies to seven categories of foul: 1. Serious foul play 2. Violent conduct 3. Spitting at another person 4. Denying a goal by handball (outside the box) 5. Denying an obvious goalscoring opportunity by a foul (outside the box) 6. Offensive language 7. Receiving a second yellow card within the same match

In the first four categories, VAR is permitted to intervene. In the last three, VAR is not permitted to intervene directly – but may intervene indirectly if the error is clear and obvious.

Takeaway: Refereeing Trends and Improvement Proposals

Looking ahead, there are three trends I consider irreversible in the field of football refereeing.

Trend 1: Technology will go ever deeper into decisions. From World Cup 2026 to now, FIFA has trialled semi-automated offside technology (SAOT) and ball sensors. These technologies will shift many decisions from referees to machines – especially position and timing decisions.

Trend 2: The intervention threshold will be standardised globally. IFAB is in the process of building a more detailed set of guidance on the VAR intervention threshold, to reduce differences between competitions and referee groups.

Trend 3: The referee's role will shift from "judge" to "match manager." Referees will decide fewer specific situations directly, but will decide more about tempo, emotion, and match management.

From these three trends, I have three specific proposals.

Proposal 1: Make the VAR intervention threshold public

Currently, the VAR intervention threshold is defined by the phrase "clear and obvious" – but there is no specific definition of what is "clear" and what is "obvious." I propose IFAB publish a concrete set of criteria, for example: an offside error is deemed "clear" if the margin is under 5 centimetres; a handball error is deemed "clear" if the ball-to-hand distance is under 0.5 metres.

Making the intervention threshold public will help fans understand why some situations are reviewed and some are not – and reduce controversy about consistency.

Proposal 2: Train referees to a global norm

The gap between UEFA's 4.02 interventions/match and CAF's 5.25 interventions/match at World Cup 2026 shows the need for a more uniform training programme. I propose FIFA organise VAR training courses every two years for all international-level referees, with tests on specific intervention thresholds.

Proposal 3: Make VAR footage public after the match

Currently, VAR footage is not made public. This creates an information gap: fans see the decision but not the evidence. I propose FIFA publish VAR footage after each match, at least for controversial decisions. Public disclosure will increase transparency and help fans understand decisions more clearly.

Closing: 335 Times the Law Was Called

When I closed my 335-line notebook after the France – Croatia final on July 15, 2026, I did not feel I had witnessed a revolution. I felt I had witnessed an evolution – slow, painful, full of controversy, but irreversible.

Through the referee's eye, you cheer for no one. You only look for the one who is right. And across 335 VAR interventions at World Cup 2026, I found those who were right – not perfect, not infallible, but those who tried to apply the law seriously under the hardest conditions.

Football will never be perfect. There will always be edge situations, controversial decisions, moments when even footage cannot answer. But football will also never return to the pre-VAR era – because once fans know that decisions can be verified, they will not accept a system in which decisions cannot be verified.

335 VAR interventions, 335 times the law was called on the pitch. That is not a dry statistic. It is a statement about how football sees itself: as a sport governed by law, not by emotion.

And if you ask me whether VAR makes football better, my answer is: VAR has made football more honest about its own errors. That is not perfection – but it is progress.

Every time I rewatch the France – Croatia final, I pause at the 38th minute and look at the moment Pitana pointed to the penalty spot. Three and a half minutes reviewing footage – three and a half minutes the referee spent ensuring his decision could be verified. In those three and a half minutes, football changed – not in how it is played, but in how the law is called.